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Each of China’s dynasties has sought to legitimize itspower through new interpretations of history. Afterconsolidating its rule, one of a dynasty’s first acts has
consisted of writing the history of the preceding dynasty. Al-
though this tradition was interrupted by the establishment of
the Republic in 1911, it has remained very important for
Chinese rulers to ground their power in history.
This tendency has been reinforced by the fact that since
1949, China has been ruled by a communist party. Ever
since the 1917 October Revolution, communist regimes
have been known for their great ability to manipulate history.
Comparing photographs of leaders, counting the number of
feet and heads, dividing one by the other and finding some-
thing odd has been a pastime of many a Sovietologist. The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has inherited both
China’s own tradition and the practice put in place by the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Moreover, in the ab-
sence of elections or other forms of legitimizing power, mo-
bilization of the past has played an essential role.
Anniversaries of various revolutionary episodes punctuate
the lives of Chinese citizens. The founding of the CCP on
July 1, Army Day on August 1, the anniversary of the May
4th movement, and the proclamation of the People’s Repub-
lic on October 1 provide opportunities to celebrate the unity
of the people behind its leadership and, since television has
made its way into every citizen’s home, to eulogize old rev-
olutionaries through interviews. History’s presence is mani-
fest even in the social structure itself, as the date of partici-
pation in revolutionary activities (canjia geming) is a crite-
rion for promotion in the bureaucracy — the earlier one
joined the Party, the higher one’s rank.
The dates are obviously selected according to political crite-
ria, and since the founding of the People’s Republic, the list
of celebrations has undergone many changes. While some of
those mentioned above pertain to the continuity of the
Party’s rule, many others are linked to a certain political line:
whereas 16 July 1967, the day Mao Zedong swam in the
Yangtze, was celebrated all over China until 1976,((1) nobody
thinks any more of mentioning the date, which brings back
bad memories. The importance of historical dates was most
strikingly revealed during the Cultural Revolution, when
most Red Guard groups were named after the date of an
event crucial for their existence.
However, manipulation of history and celebration of an-
niversaries are not an exclusive characteristic of CCP rule.
All political regimes feel the need to ground their legitimacy
in history, democracies being no exception. Even in Western
countries, history is often manipulated by ruling parties,((2)
and any official history is inevitably manipulated to some ex-
tent by the ruling party. In the case of the People’s Repub-
lic of China, however, there is only official history, and free-
dom of discussion in this area has always been either absent
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This paper suggests how control over transmission of memory by the Party, applying China’s own dynastic tradition of
reinterpreting history, and borrowing the Soviet practice of erasing people and events from records, has hindered the
structuring of an opposition movement. Each resistance movement since 1949 has had to start from scratch as its actors,
isolated from the past, always saw themselves as innovators. The paper analyses the 1957 Anti-Rightist Movement and the
1989 pro-democracy demonstrations to illustrate the thesis.
1. On 16 July 1966, Mao Zedong swam in the Yangtze River in Wuhan (see Li Zhisui, The
Private Life of Chairman Mao, London, Chatto and Windus, 1994, p. 406). After that, on
every July 16, all those who could swim dived into rivers, lakes and the sea to emulate
the Great Helmsman.
2. One has only to consider the controversies in recent years in France over “memorials”
linked to the Holocaust or to the colonial era.
or strictly limited. The following Soviet era anecdote could
well apply to the Middle Kingdom:
Question heard on Armenian Radio – “Is it possible
to foretell the future?”
Answer – “Yes, that’s no problem. We know exactly
what the future will be like. Our problem is with the
past. That keeps on changing.”((3)
The writing of history has been a vital exercise in all social-
ist countries, as their political leaders are supposed to have
been designated by the laws of human development to ac-
complish the historical task of leading the people towards
the glorious goal of communism. Therefore, when a leader
is disgraced, he has to be erased from history books and can
be remembered only in a negative way. The case of Liu
Shaoqi is quite revealing. Whereas during the 1950s he had
been presented as a major leader of the working class move-
ment before Liberation, he was labelled a scab during the
Cultural Revolution, and schoolchildren were taught to hate
his name. The same happened to Marshal Lin Biao, whose
name was erased from the campaigns of the War of Libera-
tion after he “betrayed” the Great Helmsman in 1971. He
is a figure of contempt to this day. This is not the place to
enter into all the details of how leaders were first erased and
then reinstated in official history. But the numbers of offi-
cials assigned to this task and the care with which history is
periodically rewritten show that the monopoly over interpre-
tation of the past is deemed an essential instrument of polit-
ical control by communist parties the world over. During the
Cultural Revolution, this mania reached ridiculous extremes:
subscribers to the Renmin Ribao regularly received notices
asking them to scrap a page from a past issue because the
author of an article had fallen from grace or because a piece
of news had eulogized a person since labelled a counter-rev-
olutionary. The need to control the past was so strong that
during the late 1960s and the early 1970s, readers in public
libraries were denied access to newspaper issues dating back
more than a year.Control  of  memory :  an important  part  o f  pol it i ca l  education
Controlling the official record of events, however important,
is not enough. Besides mobilizing history to its service, the
CCP has attached a special importance to controlling mem-
ory, which since the days of Mao Zedong has been an im-
portant part of what was once called “class education” (jieji
jiaoyu). Whenever sent to the countryside or to a factory for
even a short visit, pupils from primary and secondary schools
had to listen to old peasants or old farmers recall the suffer-
ing of the past — yiku sitian, or recalling the bitter (past) to
appreciate the sweet (present). In the 1960s and the 1970s,
these recitations represented an important part of the politi-
cal upbringing of young people.
These were not descriptions of historical events, but stories
of ordinary people that were supposed to make young peo-
ple feel what life in the old society had been like and real-
ize how lucky they were to live under the CCP’s glorious
leadership. The ritualised story-telling always started with a
description of the utter poverty that reigned before Libera-
tion (in factories, workers were made to toil for long hours
for miserable wages, living in horrible slums, while in the
countryside, landless peasants were compelled to do the
hardest jobs for the landlords) and of hunger that was all-
pervasive. Then, the story reached a climax when the land-
lord (or capitalist) resorted to violence against the story
teller (rapes were never clearly mentioned by women, but
the audience could imagine it, as lust was presented as a typ-
ical feature of exploiters). The poor tried to resist but were
impotent until one of them (usually the story teller) got in
touch with the Red Army (the People’s Liberation Army or
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Zhu De, Mao Zedong and (only on the bottom photo) 
Liu Shaoqi, who fell victim to the Cultural Revolution. 
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PLA) which finally came to liberate the village (or the
town) and put the people in power. In the 1970s in some
places, the story did not end there, because very quickly
many Communists were revealed to be rightists or revision-
ist agents of landlords; people had to wait until the Cultural
Revolution was launched “by Chairman Mao himself” to be
genuinely liberated.
These stories were manipulated by the leadership to serve
ongoing struggles. Thus, in some places during the 1970s,
yiku designated the suffering of ordinary people both under
the Kuomintang regime and during the “17 years of the
black revisionist line,” and negative characters were as likely
to be revisionist cadres as landlords (or capitalists).((4) In the
late 1970s, the situation was reversed — the bad guys be-
came the “Gang of Four” and the rebels turned into ca-
reerists (yinmoujia).
These manipulated and ritualized memories have always
constituted an important resource in the repertoire of CCP
propaganda. Usually compiled under the supervision of
Party secretaries, they obviously followed the political line of
the moment, and roles were assigned accordingly. The tales
of bitterness were considered an efficient complement to the
official version of history taught in schools because they ap-
pealed to pupils’ feelings while history manuals invoked rea-
son. Since the Maoist era, “class feelings” (jieji ganqing)
have been an important part of the character of the “new
man,” perhaps the more so as feelings towards the opposite
sex were repressed. All those who were educated during the
1950s and 1960s were deeply impressed by these stories,
which were part of any school outing. The appeal to emo-
tion was manipulated to the extent that during the Cultural
Revolution, cadres organized yiku fan (“remembering the
bitter” meals) in which urban youths (but also, in some
cases, young peasants) had to eat wild vegetables and all
sorts of terrible foods that poor peasants were thought to
have been reduced to consuming before Liberation.((5)
This emphasis on the use of manipulated personal memory
to convey the political message of the moment shows that
Communist leaders were aware of the importance of direct
personal contact in the psychological formation of youths. It
was actually quite efficient. Xu Youyu had this to say about
youths during the Cultural Revolution: “Although two years
of political movement had provoked doubt and suspicions to-
wards political faith, certain ideas were deeply rooted in our
minds, such as ‘the old and the new society are two com-
pletely different worlds,’ ‘the complete liberation of poor
peasants,’ and that type of propaganda.”((6) These ideas ob-
viously went hand in hand with hatred for landlords and the
Kuomintang, but also for peasants who resisted forced col-
lectivization. In this official narrative, the peasants who had
often fought for the CCP before Liberation, but had op-
posed its policies in the mid-1950s, were deemed to be the
same as reactionaries. Thus, opposition to the CCP
equalled opposition to the people. This aspect of the Party’s
monopoly over memory is one of the factors explaining the
very long time it took for even the most radical Red Guards
to question the regime’s legitimacy.
Nevertheless, some examples show that even the most total-
itarian regimes are unable to completely control the expres-
sion of memory. In a village in Henan, a rusticated youth
was moved to tears by a “poor and middle” peasant’s((7) ac-
count of famine. In the discussion that ensued (an essential
part of the unfolding of this typical séance of mobilization),
the youths gave vent to their hatred of the Kuomintang land-
lords and their feudal allies, whose policies had led their
class brothers to famine, to which the peasant replied: “But
I am not talking of the days before Liberation. In those times
we had plenty to eat. No, I’m talking about the terrible years
1960 and 61 [the Great Leap Forward].”((8) This is not an
isolated case. Xu Youyu said this of peasants in Sichuan:
Before the meetings, cadres explained many times to
old peasants that while recalling bitterness, they
shouldn’t harp on the wrong bitterness; they should
recall the pre-1949 bitterness, not the 1962 bitter-
ness. Despite that, old people who were not clear
about it talked about their sufferings in 1962, describ-
ing how terrible the famine had been, how a great
many people had died of hunger. Because of the Cul-
tural Revolution propaganda, they would place the
blame on Liu Shaoqi, but angry cadres would shout
at them: “We ask you to remember Chiang Kai-
shek’s bitterness, not Liu Shaoqi’s!” (9) 
These slips in the workings of the propaganda machinery led
the youths of the 1960s to discover that propaganda was full
3. Quoted in Rubie Watson (ed), Memory, History, and Opposition, Santa Fe, School of
American Research Press, 1994, p. 1.
4. This was the case in the many communes I visited as a student in Liaoning in 1976.
5. Xu Youyu, “Wode zaofan shengya: Shangshan xiaxiang nao geming (My experience of
‘rebellion’: Up to the mountains and down to the village to make revolution),” in Xu
Youyu, Ziyou de yanshuo (Free speech), Changchun, Changchun Publishing House,
1999, p. 91.
6. Ibid.
7. As ordinary peasants used to be called  (pingxia zhongnong).
8. Interview with a rusticated youth from Beijing, 1989.
9. Xu Youyu, Op cit, p. 92.
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of lies, and that all-out collectivization was loathed by all
peasants, not only by the offspring of landlords, as official
discourse had it. These uncontrolled memories therefore
played an important role in the political formation of many
a member of the “rusticated youth” generation and repre-
sented an essential step on the road to organizing opposition.Unwritt en history
Of course, the more importance the Party attaches to dis-
course about the past, the more it tries to control it. In a
regime that holds no regular elections to confirm its leaders’
legitimacy, history is an important asset. It was already the
case in the Soviet Union: “Official history was the pivot of
the regime’s ideology, a regime which had no other sources
to legitimate the Party monopoly on power. The specificity
of official Soviet history, a modern avatar of ‘divine right to
rule’ legitimacy, precisely comes from this peculiar situa-
tion.”((10)
This can apply to the Chinese case too, but it is rarely as
simple as the Party wants it to be. Often, official organiza-
tions such as the PLA or the CCP Central Committee have
not played the exact role accorded to them in history manu-
als, which tend to present the conquest of power as a heroic
struggle by Party members under the leadership of the Cen-
tral Committee. Thus, historical events that do not corrobo-
rate this thesis cannot even be mentioned, and personal or
family memories that differ from the Party line are mopped
up with incredible vigour.
The writer Zhang Kangkang, in a novelette entitled Collec-
tive Memory,((11)shows that even at the end of the twentieth
century some events, although accomplished by Commu-
nists during the War of Liberation, have been expelled from
history, and even from memory. Zhang’s story is of a Party
historian who must write a piece about the liberation of his
city. He finds out that a woman who had studied abroad and
become a Communist upon her return to China during the
anti-Japanese war had played a major part in this event.
Through her love for an engineer working with the KMT,
she was able to save from destruction a strategic bridge that
the PLA needed in order to continue its advance. When the
historian tries to get information about that event, he finds
no record of it in the archives and cannot get any confirma-
tion from the old general who has entered history books as
the city’s liberator. In his interview with the historian, the
general insists on the need to “take the big picture into ac-
count” and to dwell on the PLA’s role. However, the histo-
rian refuses to give up and finally finds the woman. Having
been labelled a Rightist in 1957, she has only just been re-
habilitated. Living with her family in a tiny apartment, she
has lost all illusions and refuses to tell him her story, thus ex-
pressing her conviction that her personal memory will never
be allowed to challenge the official version of history. The
story ends with the article being censored by the historian’s
superior. Although this story is presented as fiction, it refers
to actual events.((12) It illustrates that without the consent of
the upper echelons, even a piece of history that has not been
deemed negative by the Party cannot make its way into col-
lective memory, and is even excluded from personal mem-
ory. 
Naturally, episodes of resistance to Party rule have been
eliminated more thoroughly from both official history and
personal memory. “The colonization of public and private
space is one of the hallmarks of state socialism.”((13)To  remember is  to  forget  
Psychologists have shown that forgetfulness is an indispensa-
ble element in the process of memory. No memory is possi-
ble if all details of a person’s life are remembered: memory
is a process of selection. The Party’s memory therefore re-
sorts to forgetfulness so as to build itself. But far from being
a natural process as in the workings of memory analyzed by
philosophers, in this case it is officially decreed and
achieved by teams of specialists. Leaders indicate which
part of past experience should be remembered according to
the political line of the moment — for example, during the
first three decades of the People’s Republic, there was an
insistence on identifying the class origin of people behind
acts of sabotage — and on forgetting acts of resistance by
peasants, Rightists or various kinds of so-called counter-rev-
olutionaries.
During its first decades in power, when it was able to com-
mand the following of broad masses of people, the CCP
was so keen on controlling the minds of citizens, especially
youths, that it virtually banned people from passing on their
personal ideas and memories, even to family members. “If
the family head’s political attitude coincided with the official
one, he would forcefully encourage his children to become
10. Maria Ferretti, “La mémoire refoulée: La Russie devant le passé stalinien (Repressed
Memory: Russia Confronts its Stalinist Past ), ” Annales en Histoire et sciences sociales,
November-December 1995, p. 1239.
11. Zhang Kangkang, “Jiti jiyi (Collective Memory),” Shouhuo, n°6, 1999.
12. Interview with Zhang Kangkang, Beijing, 1999.
13. Rubie Watson, op. cit., 1994, p. 19.
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activists. Otherwise, the great majority encouraged their off-
spring to follow the official line, in the interests of their fu-
ture. In many cases, people were afraid to express their dis-
dain for the authorities, fearing they could be denounced by
their children.” And in fact, there were many instances of
children “drawing a line of demarcation from their parents”
(huaqing jiexian).((14) Moreover, when people were targeted
by a movement, their spouses divorced them so as not to be
labelled counter-revolutionary as well. Those who refused to
do so never talked about the spouse who had been labelled
a reactionary, and who in many cases had been sent to the
countryside for re-education, if not to jail. They especially
refrained from presenting the spouse’s ideas objectively to
their children to let them judge for themselves. The pressure
was so great that even in the hearth and home, family mem-
bers resorted to officialese when talking to each other. Peo-
ple would use newspaper jargon to refer to the “crimes” of
their spouses so that children would not “make mistakes” by
using the “wrong” words while at school.
Further, memory as the transmission of the manner in which
public events have been experienced — especially episodes
of resistance — was carefully controlled by the authorities
during the Mao era to the extent that, for instance, even the
descendents of Rightists were unaware of the content of
their parents’ discourse.((15) To them, their progenitors were
counter-revolutionaries who had willy-nilly spoken against
the people. As a result, when they had the opportunity to
vent their frustrations against the regime, when Mao called
upon them to “bombard the bourgeois headquarters,” they
could not call upon the experience of the previous genera-
tion. It would take them many years to trace the route that
had cost their parents so dearly. The  memories  o f Righti sts  andRed Guards
During the Cultural Revolution, and the subsequent sending
down of youths to the countryside, many young urbanites
who blindly believed in Party propaganda and obeyed Mao’s
call were convinced that the 1957 Rightists had been
counter-revolutionaries hostile to the people. The youths did
not hesitate to persecute and beat them in the early years of
the movement. Moreover, in their opposition to the excesses
of what they termed the “new bourgeoisie,” they never
tapped the political legacy of the Hundred Flowers move-
ment, out of ignorance and because memory of the move-
ment had been obliterated. It was through the exchange of
experiences — the “Great Linking-up” (da chuanlian) — or
during their stay in the countryside that they began to see
that the Rightists’ ideas were not so outrageous. 
It is worth quoting at length Wei Jingsheng’s experience
with a Rightist. In 1966, Wei was a radical Red Guard — of
“good” class background, as his father was a military officer
— and during the movement he had been involved with a
group (Liandong, the United Action Committee) that had
adopted a violent attitude against most “counter-revolutionar-
ies.” But despite his prejudices, reality made him change his
mind and helped him take the path of opposition:
... An “old Rightist” we had met [during travels in Xin-
jiang] confessed to us that she would never have
thought, when she joined the Party, that one day it
would come to be controlled by such cruel and inhu-
mane individuals as those currently in power. Such talk
shocked us at first and we thought she deserved her
“rightist” label. But ... she told us many real stories, in-
cluding her own, which imparted her words with an au-
thority that was difficult to deny and aroused great in-
terest in me... The experience of “old Rightists” gave
rise to another question: “Why are good people always
defeated and why do bad ones always triumph?” Al-
though she appeared very ill at ease with us because of
her rightist background, I thought she was a good per-
son and that people like her would never willingly have
hurt the people’s interest. To label her a “Rightist” had
been wrong in the first place, and it was a scandal that
such an honest and competent person had been de-
ported to that isolated place...((16)
Wei is not the only dissident whose ignorance of the past de-
layed the process of realisation. Zhang Musheng was the
son of a leading cadre who had gone voluntarily to the coun-
tryside in Inner Mongolia in 1965. His stay in that remote
place had made him think that the peasants, hostile to col-
lectivization, were “reactionary.” But in 1966, talking to an-
other rusticated youth who had adopted a policy of decollec-
92 N o  2 0 0 7 / 4
14. Xu Youyu, “‘Wenge’ de qiyin (The root causes of the Cultural Revolution),” in Xu Youyu,
Op.cit, p.141. This is not a specific feature of China alone: Pavel Korchaghin, the hero of
How Steel was Tempered, made himself famous by denouncing his “reactionary” par-
ents. In 2000, this book was well stocked in Beijing bookstores.
15. In his autobiography, Wei Jingsheng recalls the story of a Rightist he met in Xinjiang dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution. When Wei went to tell her husband how she was faring, “the
man refused to admit that he had any relation with his children’s mother.“ See “Autobi-
ographie de Wei Jingsheng (Wei Jingsheng’s autobiography),” in V. Sidane and W.
Zafanolli, Procès politiques à Pékin (Political trials in Beijing), Paris, Maspero, 1981, pp.
65-66.
16. Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
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tivisation in an isolated brigade he led, Zhang started to
wonder whether he had been mistaken: the problem might
lie with the Party, not with the people, after all:
So he started to read prohibited books on the history
of the communist international. He also read works by
Chinese “Rightists,” such as Ma Yanshu’s speeches
on demography, writings by Chu Anping denouncing
the “Party empire” (dang tianxia), and big volumes of
Rightists’ opinions and criticism of the Party’s rule,
Ding Ling’s “March 8th is Good” and Wang Shiwei’s
“Wild Lilies”... He compared Liu’s and Mao’s
speeches at the 7,000 cadres’ meeting in 1962 and
found out that China’s problem could not be solved by
merely applying class struggle... His personal experi-
ence in the countryside led him to re-evaluate Peng
Dehuai’s “anti-Party opinion.” The documents ad-
dressed to the Party by the Rightist Lin Xiling in
1957 left a deep impression on him... In the words of
one of Zhang Musheng’s friends: “Today, we keep
discussing politics, but we still have not seen through
as thoroughly as the Rightists did in 1957.” ((17)
Ignorance of previous episodes of resistance and lack of
transmission of such memory deprive the new generation of
the rich heritage those experiences represent. The absence
of a structured memory means that it has always been diffi-
cult to organise an opposition movement. As the only infor-
mation about the Hundred Flowers movement came from
political education classes under the CCP’s absolute con-
trol, the Red Guards were unaware of the opinions that peo-
ple who came to be labelled “Rightists” had expressed ear-
lier, while denouncing their “reactionary ideology.” Only
when they personally experienced the absolutism of CCP
rule did they extend the scope of their criticism to the
regime as such. But at this stage, they lacked intellectual re-
sources to develop their analyses. They could not use the
Rightists’ experiences and ideas. They had never heard of
the journal Guangchang, founded by Peking University
(Beida) students and prohibited in May 1957. They had to
start from scratch, and they, too, founded “autonomous
newspapers,” but the language they used was far less sophis-
ticated that than of the earlier Rightists.
Writing in the 1990s, Xu Youyu recalls how he ignored the
warnings of his cousin who had been labelled a Rightist in 1957:
During the Cultural Revolution, he warned me as I
went out each day to post dazibao on the city walls.
But I did not heed his warnings. I thought: “Your
anti-rightist movement was nothing. This time, the
supreme leader himself has liberated the ‘rightist stu-
dents,’ he has guaranteed that there would not be any
‘settling of accounts after the autumn harvest’ (Qi-
uhou suanzhang).”((18) Later, I realized that I and my
generation had been duped. I went to the country-
side, and when I came back to the city three years
later, I found my younger cousin busy writing daz-
ibao, denouncing his school principal and participat-
ing in the education revolution. I felt very sad: once a
generation has seen through deception, it immedi-
ately makes way for the next generation. When I
tried to understand the cause of this phenomenon, I
discovered the limits of individual discourse: the les-
sons of our generation’s experience had not entered
the collective narrative, had not become part of a col-
lective memory, and the students who came after us
had not heard of it.((19)
Xu’s reflections show the contempt in which youths of the
Red Guard generation held their elders. They were all the
more surprised when later, either through personal contacts
or through the reading of “forbidden materials,”((20) they
found out that their predecessors had already covered a
good part of the road to awareness. Thus, the wish of Tan
Tianrong, a Rightist from Peking University, that “May 19th
[1957, the day the Democracy Wall started at Beida] and
May 4th [1919, the beginning of the New Culture move-
ment] will remain in the minds of our younger brothers and
sisters, eternally encouraging the youths who will come
later,”((21) has not been fulfilled. In the 1960s, even those
most radically hostile to bureaucracy among the Red
17. Liu Xiaomeng, “Wenge zhong zhishiqingnian de miwang yu juexing (Ignorance and
awareness of rusticated youths during the Cultural Revolution),” in Ji Cilin, Niu Han,
Deng Jiuping (ed) Women dou jingliguo de rizi (The days we have been through), Beijing
Shiyue wenyi chubanshe, 2000, pp. 512-3. All the titles quoted in this passage have
been labelled reactionary by the authorities. The earliest, Wang Shiwei’s Wild Lilies and
Ding Ling’s “March 8th is good,” were written in 1942.
18. In 1966, work teams sent by Liu Shaoqi to Beijing universities had labelled most radical
Red Guards as rightists or counter-revolutionaries. Later, Mao disbanded the work teams
and rehabilitated the students.
19. Xu Youyu, “Jiyi yu shenghuo (Memory and Life),” an unpublished document sent by the
author.
20. During the raids carried out in the early phase of the Cultural Revolution, many Red
Guards stole books from the personal libraries of the “Stinking ninth” (Chou laojiu) i.e.
intellectuals. Later, these books made their way to the countryside. Other youngsters
took advantage of the prevailing chaos to go and read “forbidden books” in forgotten
corners of libraries.
21. Tan Tianrong: “Jiujiu xinling (Save the souls),” in Niu Han, Deng Jiuping (eds), Yuan
shang cao: Jiyi zhong de fanyou yundong (Grass on the Steppe, the Anti Rightist Cam-
paign in Our Memory), Beijing, Jingji ribao chubanshe, 1998, p. 13.
Guards((22) were unable to draw inspiration from these writ-
ings, and thus were unable to escape the conceptual cate-
gories imposed by the regime. It is possible that if memory
had not been controlled, the criticisms made by the Right-
ists might have helped them put up more effective resist-
ance. It was only at the start of the twenty-first century that
the discourses of 1957 were published.
In his preface to the first anthology of original writings of
1957,((23) the noted literary critic Qian Liqun recalls that the
discourse of the 1957 Rightists is still subject to some sort of
taboo. He notes that during Peking University’s centenary
celebration in 1998, hardly anyone referred to that period,
because “it (was) not easy to talk about it.” Qian shares the
firm view that obliteration of memory has been an important
factor in slowing down China’s political evolution:
Because for a very long time (even until now), we
have forgotten these predecessors, these people who
sacrificed themselves! Our historians (including my-
self) have not done our work! The books written
about the 1957 period are so empty, so full of mis-
takes (miwu) that the “youths who came after” (who
were really the hope of their predecessors) have no
way of understanding it. This is a disgrace for those
who have followed, for the scholars!((24)
The trilogy to which Qian wrote the preface is a rare one.
In 2003, when Zhang Yihe, the daughter of “number one
Rightist” Zhang Bojun, published her book entitled The
Past is not like Smoke on her father and his comrades, it
was banned on the mainland.((25) In 2007, all attempts at or-
ganizing meetings to commemorate the Anti-Rightist Move-
ment came to naught, as the Propaganda Department for-
bade them. Another book by Zhang Yihe on the ordeals
faced by an opera singer labelled a Rightist in 1957 was also
banned.((26)The  end of  Maoism andresurgence  of  memory
The only way for forbidden memories to reappear, and for
at least a part of obliterated history to return to the public
sphere, is through a change of political line. But such a re-
emergence is constrained by strict limitations. Obviously,
this is not unique to China. After the 20th Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, books, meetings and
family reunions tackled the subject of Stalinist repression.
This was when Alexander Solzhenitsyn published his One
Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, when films described
the “excesses” of the Stalinist period, when writers and or-
dinary victims returned to their families and began telling
their stories. But they were not allowed to question the legit-
imacy of communist rule.
This kind of resurgence is not limited to communist systems.
In Chile and Argentina, democratization has been accompa-
nied by a flood of memories of victims of repression and
reappraisal of recent history. In Morocco, since the corona-
tion of Mohamed VI in 1999, the true history of political
struggle and labour camps under Hassan II has made its way
into the public domain and forms an important resource for
pro-democracy parties. “Behind the avalanche of historical
narratives and their interpretations, one can perceive that
the state is progressively losing its monopoly on the writing
of history.”((27)
The aftermath of Mao’s death was likewise a period in
which memories obliterated for two decades or more reap-
peared with official sanction, and history was rewritten in
order to lend legitimacy to Deng Xiaoping’s line. However,
here again, these texts had to respect the narrative drawn up
by the authorities: whereas it was acceptable to denounce
the “excesses” of the “Gang of Four,” it was out of the ques-
tion to attack Mao or the CCP. Besides, new narratives had
to follow the yiku sitian structure, and rehabilitated persons
had always to congratulate themselves on the excellent situ-
ation that prevailed following the 3rd Plenary Session of the
11th Party Central Committee held in December 1978.
Many events that had not been re-evaluated could not be
raised in public. For example, as the “decision on historical
mistakes” adopted by the Central Committee in 1981 stated
that the Anti-Rightist Campaign had been too broad, but
was justified, it has never been possible to raise the question
of its legitimacy in public, and all books that have been pub-
lished about it have had to follow these guidelines.
But things go even further. In the early 1980s, the new lead-
ership declared that the nation had to look towards the fu-
22. Cf. Yang Xiguang, “Zhongguo xiang he chu qu? (Whither China?),” in Révo Cul dans la
Chine Pop (Cul Rev in Pop China), Paris, 10/18, 1974.
23. Anthologies of “reactionary views,” especially those of rightists, were published as con-
fidential editions (neibu) and served as fodder for denunciation campaigns.
24. Qian Liqun, Bu rong mosha de sixiang yichan (An ideological heritage difficult to negate),
in Niu Han, Deng Jiuping (eds), Yuan shang cao: Jiyi zhong de fanyou yundong, Op Cit.,
p. 13.
25. It was published in Hong Kong under the title Zuihou de Guizu (The last aristocrats),
Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 2004.
26. Lingren wangshi (Past stories of Beijing Opera stars), Hunan Wenyi Chubanshe, Chang-
sha, 2007.
27. See Benjamin Stora, “Maroc, le traitement des histoires proches (Morocco, the treat-
ment of recent history),” Esprit, 8-9, 2000, p. 91.
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ture in order to achieve modernization. To this day, although
leaders who have initiated political reforms had themselves
been victimized during the various movements launched by
Mao, they have done everything in their power to block
spontaneous acts of remembrance. The fact that in 1987 Liu
Binyan and Wang Ruowang were planning to organize a
large-scale meeting in May to remember those who had
dared criticize the Party 30 years earlier during the Hun-
dred Flowers campaign was an important factor in the cen-
tral authorities’ decision to expel them from the CCP.((28)
Worse still, when Xu Youyu and a few friends decided in
1996 to publish a book series and a journal dedicated to the
memory of the Cultural Revolution on the occasion of the
30th anniversary of the movement’s launch by Mao, they
were prevented from doing so. When a Guangzhou period-
ical, Jiaodian, published a long article by Xu detailing the
early events of 1966,((29) it was closed down. 
These acts make it hard to believe that the legitimacy of the
post-1978 CCP leadership has been grounded in the denun-
ciation of the decade-long Cultural Revolution. But they
show that, whatever its judgement on a certain period, the
Party is reluctant to forsake its monopoly on interpreting his-
tory. It is particularly suspicious of any eruption of personal
memories that might contravene the official line. In fact, the
controllers of ideology are convinced that if ordinary citizens
are allowed to publish their views on a historical period, it
would be the first step towards the publication of documents
critical of the regime.
Ten years later, the authorities not only banned activities
commemorating the Hundred Flowers movement and the
Cultural Revolution, they also barred some historians from
taking part in conferences abroad.((30)
It is clear that in the 1980s, the CCP relaxed its hold on the
public sphere and was obliged to forsake its grip on the pri-
vate lives of its subjects. The release of vast numbers of peo-
ple who had been jailed for political reasons, and the reha-
bilitation of great numbers of “Rightists” and “counter-revo-
lutionaries,” gave rise to a flood of memories within families
and among friends. In the early 1980s, while the leadership
was exhorting the population to look to the future (xiang
qian kan), inside crowded apartments, youths and elders
were immersed in acts of remembering. Fathers told their
true stories to their children, elder brothers to their younger
siblings. Literary journals provided a locus for these forbid-
den memories to make their way into public consciousness
through poems, short stories and novels (the so-called “scar
literature” or shanghen wenxue). In official circles too, Party
leaders started to write their memoirs, sometimes revisiting
what a journalist has called “black holes of history.” Some
targets of Maoist political campaigns, such as Hu Feng, also
wrote memoirs in which they presented a defence of their
ideas.((31)
The denunciation of the Cultural Revolution that took place
after Mao’s death, especially during the 1980s, has given
rise to a renewed wave of research into the history of the
CCP’s repression of dissent, which has continued and even
grown through the 1990s. Many texts by Rightists and dissi-
dents of the Cultural Revolution have been published on the
mainland, thanks either to surviving relatives of the victims
of various movements or to the dedication of some historians
who have made the cause of rehabilitation of these anti-he-
roes the core of their lives. A distinction should be made be-
tween those whom the central authorities decided to rehabil-
itate and others whose rehabilitation resulted (in part) from
lobbying by family members and historians.
Typical of the first category is the case of Hu Feng, whose
rehabilitation in 1980 was widely publicised. Excerpts from
his Wanyan shu were released in 1988, and it was eventu-
ally published in full on the 100th anniversary of his birth.((32)
The case of the first famous intellectual dissident of the
Communist system is more complicated. As he was person-
ally denounced by Mao in 1942, Wang Shiwei was not
among the first wave of rehabilitations in the late 1970s.
Lobbying by his wife, Liu Bao, and his son, who wrote
many letters to the Central Committee asking the authorities
to clear Wang’s name, was ignored for a long time.((33) Only
when historian Zhu Hongzhao became involved was
Wang’s case taken up. However, during his rehabilitation in
1991 it was merely denied that he had organized an anti-
Party clique of five persons and that he had been a Kuom-
intang agent.((34) He was not cleared of the accusation of
being a Trotskyist, still a crime in China. However, thanks
to this rehabilitation Wang’s works, like Hu Feng’s, have
28. Interview with Liu Binyan, Paris, May 1988.
29. Xu Youyu, “Wenhua da geming 30 nian ji” (Condolences for the 30 years of the Cultural
Revolution), in Jiaodian (Focus), n° 1996, pp. 10-38.
30. The Party has, however, not been able to impose its control entirely: a university in
Liaoning held a conference on the 40th anniversary of the Cultural Revolution in Sep-
tember 2006.
31. Hu Feng, “Jianshu shouhuo (Simple talk about my harvest).” Excerpts in Ji Cilin, Niu
Han, Deng Jiuping (eds), Zhiiman congcongde huiyi (Memoirs in clusters of branches ),
Beijing, Beijing shiyue wenyi chubanshe, pp. 1-78.
32. Hu Feng, Hu Feng Sanshiwanyanshu, Wuhan, Hubei Renmin chubanshe, 2003.
33. Liu Bao, “Qiyuan jin wei xue, xiang dang su buping,” in Zhu Hongzhao, Wang Shiwei
wenzun, Shanghai, Shanghai sanlian chubanshe, 1998, pp. 345-354.
34. “Guanyu Wang Shiwei tongzhi tuopai wenti de fucha jujeding (Decision regarding the re-
examination of comrade Wang Shiwei’s Trotskyist problem),” in Wang Shiwei wencun,
Op cit. p. 355.
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been published, and people who are interested in under-
standing the ideas of those who dared criticize the CCP in
the past can consult them and draw lessons from their fail-
ure.
More than any other field, memory makes up a major stake
in the continuing dispute pitting the CCP against the peo-
ple.Black  ho les  in  contemporaryhistory
Despite the intensity of control, some unofficial anniver-
saries (i.e., those not recognized by the authorities) have be-
come rallying points for forces of resistance. The anniversary
of the April 5th (1976) Tiananmen Incident is the most ob-
vious instance: Whereas the leadership was trying to obliter-
ate Zhou Enlai’s political heritage (after his death in Janu-
ary that year), various groups opposed to Mao’s policy de-
cided to celebrate Zhou’s memory on Qing Ming, the tradi-
tional Festival of the Dead.((35) The demonstration was se-
verely suppressed, but to many people the date became a
landmark of resistance. People denouncing the “leftist” line
in 1977 and 1978 chose the same date to put up posters crit-
ical of past Maoist policies and the leadership of Hua
Guofeng. As it enjoyed a strong backing inside the Party ap-
paratus, the movement eventually prevailed: on 15 Novem-
ber 1978, Deng Xiaoping rehabilitated the April 5th demon-
stration in an effort to eliminate his neo-Maoist rivals. Later,
the poems through which anonymous writers had de-
nounced the “feudalism of the new Qin Shihuang” (a covert
reference to Mao) were published officially. 
However, April 5th has not found a place in the official cal-
endar of celebrations beside October 1st, May 4th, July 1st
and August 1st. The fact that the demonstration was a case
of spontaneous action by the masses explains the caution
with which the authorities treat it. For each episode that has
made it into official memory, how many more remain absent
from history books? Take the case of the Democracy Wall
Movement in 1978-79, during which a good number of ex-
Red Guards expressed their criticism of the regime that had
sent them off to the countryside for a decade. For a few
months, underground journals carrying theoretical docu-
ments that discussed the nature of the regime and the way
to resolve its problems circulated in many cities.((36) Many
concerned youths, especially those who had just returned
from the countryside, took part in discussions on ways to
avoid a repeat of the tragedy. Most of them agreed on the
need to set up autonomous organs of public opinion to su-
pervise the CCP. The articles in these ephemeral publica-
tions were never published on the mainland, and even now
not a single book refers to their contents. The expression
Minzhu qiang (Democracy Wall) is itself totally absent from
official discourse.
Times have changed since the Anti-Rightist Movement.
Since the 1980s, the Party has lost the capacity to control
private discourse, and people who took part in the move-
ment can discuss their experiences with others in their
homes. However, circulation of the ideas expressed during
these two years has been effectively interrupted, and they
are not part of the common cultural heritage of would-be op-
ponents.((37) In this sense, their fate was similar to that of the
articles published in Guangchang in the late 1950s.
In fact, students who took part in discussions about political
reform in the salons of the late 1980s — the youths who
were to take the lead in the 1989 Democracy Movement —
knew nothing of the debates that had taken place a decade
earlier between the radicals led by Wei Jingsheng, who
founded Tansuo (Exploration), and moderates around Xu
Wenli’s Siwu luntan (April 5th Forum).((38) They knew more
about political debates in Western countries than about the
episodes of resistance that had taken place within China
since 1949.
The absence of a structured memory prevented these ac-
tivists from drawing the lessons of the past in the field of or-
ganization: “Democracy Wall” activists had tried to set up
local and national associations, had founded unofficial jour-
nals and had accumulated rich experience in dealing with
the authorities. They were eventually repressed but their ex-
perience was precious. However, they could not transmit it
to the younger generation, which had to start from scratch
and to create its own concepts in order to understand the
system’s workings. Of course, some ”Democracy Wall” par-
ticipants were also active in the 1989 Democracy Move-
ment,((39) but dialogue was difficult with the students, and
they could not fully use their experience in organizational
work.
35. See Claude Cadart, Cheng Ying-hsiang, Les deux morts de Mao Tse-toung (The two
deaths of Mao Zedong), Paris, Seuil, 1977.
36. On this episode, see V.Sidane, Le Printemps de Pékin (Beijing Spring), Paris, Gallimard,
1981.
37. A collection of the documents from the Democracy Wall has been published in Hong
Kong by Claude Widor, Documents on the Chinese Democratic Movement: 1978-1980,
Paris, Hong Kong, Editions de l’Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, the Ob-
server Publishers, Vol. 1, 1981, and Vol. 2, 1984.
38. When Wuer Kaixi and other student leaders visited France, they discovered their prede-
cessors’ ideas in Widor’s books.
39. See the case of Wang Juntao, the editor of the moderate underground journal Beijing zhi
chun in 1978-79, who took an active part in the movement in May 1989.
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A Chinese “Memorial”?
The blackout in history and in official memory of the 1989
movement also acts as an obstacle to the development of an
opposition. Not a single book or newspaper article published
on the mainland since 1989 has ever referred to the move-
ment in a positive or even objective light. The authorities are
very cautious, and every year they are particularly nervous
during the two-months “sensitive period” (minggan shiqi)
between 15 April and 4 June.((40) Until 2003, during these
two months, plainclothes and uniformed policemen were on
high alert not to let anyone stage the slightest act looking like
protest, and every June 4 — the anniversary of the massacre
— the cemetery at Babaoshan has been placed under the
military’s quasi-occupation, with the CCP anxious to pre-
vent any kind of gathering by relatives mourning the victims
of the massacre. Although history, as officially presented in
books and the press, never mentions the events of 1989, the
term liu si (June 4), which recalls the officially recognized
wu si (May 4th Movement) and si wu (the April 5 “Tianan-
men Incident of 1976), is extensively used by ordinary citi-
zens as well as historians and even Party cadres in private
conversation, and, of course, while abroad. 
This reference shows that things have changed since Mao’s
days, when even in personal memories political events were
only referred to by their official names. When, instead of
calling an event by its official name, ordinary people use the
term preferred by the opposition, it can be taken as a breach
in the state’s monopoly on interpretation of history. During
the years that immediately followed the Tiananmen mas-
sacre, while the official media never referred to it, most Bei-
jingers kept talking about the event. In private debates
among intellectuals, analysis of the 1989 events remained a
key topic all through the 1990s. Discussions about how to
speed up democratization always refer to this movement,
whose importance is universally recognized.((41) However,
one may only speak of liu si in private or abroad. In the pub-
lic sphere, the Party’s monopoly view remains intact. In
these circumstances, it is hard to gauge to what extent the
1989 experience forms part of the common heritage of Chi-
nese citizens.
The difficulty of transmitting memory has impeded the pro-
democracy movement from accumulating experience. Each
episode of resistance appears isolated to actors who see
themselves as radical innovators. The 1989 students were
convinced that they had been the first in the PRC’s history
to have launched a real challenge to the CCP, and failed to
see that they were only successors to a long line of resisters.
(The same could be said of the Red Guard generation).
This inability to capitalize on the memory of previous
episodes of resistance, which is obviously also due to the
Party’s ban on remembrance, has resulted in a segmentation
that has had a negative impact on the structuring of a polit-
ical opposition.
The history of resistance since 1949 has yet to be written (in
China or abroad). But so long as there is no structured mem-
ory of past experience, it is difficult to imagine the emer-
gence of a well organized opposition movement. Drawing
lessons from the past to avoid repeating errors is an impor-
tant task for any political organization, for just as the legiti-
macy of a political regime is always grounded in history, op-
position movements also need historical references. Espe-
cially in a country such as China, where government histori-
ans (and quite a few foreign specialists) tend to describe the
quest for democracy as alien to the ancient land’s culture, a
detailed history of movements resisting despotism would cer-
tainly provide sustenance to the forces that fight for democ-
racy.
The example of the Memorial Movement in the final years
of the Soviet Union((42) illustrates this point. Mikhail Gor-
bachev let memory resurface as part of his policy of Glas-
nost in order to deny his opponents historical legitimacy and
to show that Communism had been much more multi-
faceted than implied by the interpretation under Leonid
Brezhnev. The resurgence of the victims’ version of history
and the revision of episodes of resistance were instrumental
to the de-legitimization of his opponents.
China has yet to organize a Memorial Movement. Even the
great writer Ba Jin’s proposal to build a museum of the Cul-
tural Revolution was rejected by the authorities.((43) No ref-
erence to the 1989 Democracy movement can be found in
official publications, and many victims of campaigns
launched by Mao and his successors still await rehabilita-
tion.
The request for dialogue that was at the centre of the move-
ment that took place nearly 19 years ago has not been dis-
40. 15 April 1989 is the day Hu Yaobang died, triggering the student demonstrations. On
June 4, troops marched on Tiananmen, killing hundreds of unarmed protesters.
41. Not long ago, in an open letter demanding political reforms, a People’s Congress deputy
from Anhui, Wang Zhaojun, called for re-evaluation of the June 4 events:
http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/7/10/23/n1877443.htm and
http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/7/10/23/n1877443.htm (last visited 4 February 2008).
42. This organisation, which demanded a memorial to the victims of Stalinism, was founded
in 1987. It still exists, and besides its task of writing the obliterated history of Soviet re-
pression, it also defends human rights.
43. Ba Jin, “Wenge bowuguan (A museum of the Cultural Revolution),” Suixiang lu (Ba Jin’s
Random Thoughts), Beijing, Sanlian shudian, 1987, Vol.2, pp. 819-823.
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Glossary
yi ku 憶苦
si tian 思甜
yinmoujia 陰謀家
jieji ganqing 階級感情
yiku fan 憶苦飯
huaqing jiexian 劃清界限
da chuanlian 大串連
Liandong 聯動
Dang tianxia 黨天下
Guangchang 廣場
Qiuhou suanzhang 秋後算帳
xiang qian kan 向前看
Minzhu Qiang 民主牆
Tansuo 探索
Siwu luntan 四五論壇
mingan shiqi 敏感時期
Lao Zhaopian 老照片
You jianle zuotian 又見了昨天
Wode zaofan 我的造反
shengya 生涯
Wenge de qiyin 文革的起因
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cussed publicly. Cyberspace has provided a locus for dia-
logue, and one can only hope that it will help dissenters and
resisters draw lessons from past failures. In the private do-
main, memory can no longer be obliterated. Will it be able
to overcome the monopoly on the writing of history still held
by the CCP? Is the emergence of a Memorial Movement a
prerequisite to the structuring of a Chinese opposition move-
ment?
For about a decade, a number of intellectuals have been try-
ing to write another history of the PRC through recourse to
oral history and by collecting individual memories. They
generally meet inside China or abroad and publish their
works whenever there is an opportunity. The historian Ding
Dong has founded a review entitled Lao Zhaopian (Old
photographs) in which he publishes accounts by ordinary
people or political leaders from both the Republican and
PRC eras, presented through photographs culled from fam-
ily albums. The editor’s design is to present individuals’ rec-
ollections of the past, which in some cases make way for a
description of events that are not mentioned in official his-
tory. Despite the obstacles it often encounters, the project
still continues. Meanwhile, liberal intellectuals such as Xu
Youyu try to publish accounts of the Cultural Revolution, be-
ginning with their own autobiographies.((44) The People’s
Daily journalist Li Hui, who specialises in biographies of
writers, has also written about the victims of several move-
ments during the Mao era. He has published a book on the
movement against the literary critic Hu Feng, which used
documents from the 1950s to objectively retrace the cam-
paign.((45) Also worth mentioning is the book You jianle zuot-
ian by Du Gao.((46) Li Hui once happened to buy at the Pan-
jiayuan flee market a dossier discarded by a danwei (work
unit), which turned out to be personal file (dang’an) of Du
Gao, who had been accused of being a supporter of Hu
Feng in the early 1950s. Du was cleared at the time, but was
labelled a Rightist in 1957. Li gave Du photocopies of his
file, extracts of which he has published in their historical
context, thus making it an original type of autobiography.
This book shows how the authorities dealt with suspects,
and how monitoring of private conversations was used to in-
dict the speakers. It is a meticulous description of the work
of CCP cadres during a political movement. Some personal
files of Rightists have also been published. 
Thus, despite censorship and the obstacles raised by the
propaganda department, interesting texts emerge even from
official publishing houses. One can expect this trend to
grow, and it might well lead to the creation of a Chinese Me-
morial more complex than its Soviet counterpart. The cur-
rent semi-official movement that slips through the cracks of
political control does not appear as well structured as its So-
viet predecessor. Its influence on collective conscience is
likely to be weak, and it will have no direct effect on the
eventual structuring of an opposition movement. On the
other hand, it could emerge without having to wait for a re-
former to take over the Party leadership. The famously
opaque Chinese regime may yet have many tricks up its
sleeve. •
• Translated with the collaboration of N. Jayaram
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44. Xu Youyu, “Wode zaofan shengya (My experience of  “rebellion”),” in Xu Youyu, Ziyou de
yanshuo (Paroles libres), op.cit., p. 24-51,  and “Wo qinli guo de wudou (My experience
of armed struggle),” pp. 24-52.
45. Li Hui, Hu Feng jituan yuan’an shimo, Wuhan, Hubei renmin chubanshe, 2003.
46. You jianle zuotian, Beijing, Shiyue wenyi chubanshe, 2004.
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Propaganda poster from the time of the Anti-Hu
Feng campagn, calling to “Resolutely eliminate
the counter-revolutionary Hu Feng clique, and all
hidden counter-revolutionaries.” 
© IISH Stefan R. Landsberger Collection,
http://www.iisg.nl/~landsberger
